

**From Human Security to the Responsibility to Protect:
What Role Can Japan Play in an Altering Foreign Policy?**

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Abstract

Since 1998, Japan has adopted a broad concept of human security as the foreign policy for gaining global influence without revising the 1947 peace constitution. In order to support developing countries and promote human security, strengthen the coordination in areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the U.S.-Japan alliance is an ideal platform to deliver enhanced HA/DR operations in Asia. Over the past 10 years, human security policies played an important role and created the international political space for Japan's national position. At the 2005 World Summit, Japan embraced the UN Secretary-General's R2P proposal and emphasized the importance of prevention in reducing the need for intervention. Japan's support for the R2P has been reaffirmed and viewed the R2P as one element of human security, which is a central pillar of Japanese foreign policy since that time. In other words, Japan has not only primarily focused on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance but also altered its foreign policy for armed intervention. At the same time, it is also strongly committed to the UN system as a whole and is the organization's second largest donor.

Recently, the Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines take into account Japan's revised circumference situation method, including the Abe government's decision to re-interpret a constitutional provision to allow for Japanese participation in collective self-defense. These changes reflect Japan's worries over China's rise and respond to U.S.'s "Pivot to Asia" policy. Obviously, the case of Japan demonstrates that there is a significant motivation for a strategic calculation. Japan's response to R2P is the best described as a strategy of norm contestation. Also, it is clear that Japan can play an important leadership role with the R2P and be able to provide a way forward for peace. Now, more than ever, it's a good time for Japan to promote international peace and seize this opportunity. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is on human security to evaluate Japan's new foreign policy by analyzing in detail its position on the R2P and

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a range of policy issues relating to the R2P. Meantime, the research examines whether the Japan is committed to improving state's capacity to respond to reinterpretation of Article 9, to prevent of armed conflict, and to support peacebuilding. The significance of research argues that Japan plays an active leadership role across the abroad range of issues from human security to the R2P.

Keywords: Japan's Foreign Policy, Human Security, R2P, China's Rise, and Pivot to Asia

I. Introduction

Since 1998, Japan has adopted a broad concept of human security as the foreign policy for gaining global influence without revising the 1947 peace constitution. In order to support developing countries and promote human security, strengthen the coordination in areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the U.S.-Japan alliance is an ideal instrumentality to deliver enhanced HA/DR operations in Asia.¹ Over the past 10 years, human security policies played an important role and created the international political space for Japan's national position.² At the 2005 World Summit, Japan embraced the UN Secretary-General's R2P proposal³ and emphasized the importance of prevention in reducing the need for intervention.⁴ Japan's support for the R2P has been reaffirmed and viewed the R2P as one element of human security, which is a central pillar of Japanese foreign policy since that time.⁵ In other words, Japan has not only primarily focused on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance but also altered its foreign policy for armed intervention. At the same time, it is also strongly committed to the UN system as a whole and is the organization's second largest donor.⁶

Recently, the 2015 New Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines take into account Japan's revised circumference situation method, including the Abe government's decision to re-interpret a constitutional provision to allow for Japanese participation in collective self-defense. These changes reflect Japan's worries over China's rise and respond to U.S.'s "Pivot to Asia" policy. Obviously, the case of Japan demonstrates that there is a significant motivation for a strategic calculation. Japan's response to R2P is the best described as a strategy of norm contestation. Also, it is clear that Japan

¹ Thomas B. Fargo, Noboru Yamaguchi, Ryo Sahashi, Kei Koga and Alison Szalwinski, *Preparing for Future Disasters: Strategic Assistance and the U.S.-Japan Alliance* (Washington, DC: NBR Special Report 52, 2015).

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2016* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2016), section 2.

³ The term "Responsibility to Protect" was first presented in a report of the ICISS in December 2001. The Commission had been formed in response to Kofi Annan's question of when the international community must intervene for human protection purposes. The R2P stresses that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from the action of humanitarian intervention. Alex Chiang and Yu-tai Tsai, "A New Interpretation for the Relevance of Sovereignty and Human Rights: the Case of Responsibility to Protect," *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2012), pp. 39-80.

⁴ Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, *Japan and the Republic of Korea on the Responsibility to Protect* (Brisbane: Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2008), <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Japan%20and%20Korea%20on%20R2P.pdf>

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ "Statement by H.E. Mr. Toshiro Ozawa Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations," *Global Policy Forum*, October 17, 2005, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/132/27316.html>

can play an important leadership role with the R2P and be able to provide a way forward for peace. Now, more than ever, it's a good time for Japan to promote international peace and seize this opportunity.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is through human security to evaluate Japan's new foreign policy by analyzing in detail its position on the R2P and a range of policy issues relating to the R2P. Meantime, the paper examines whether the Japan is committed to improving state's capacity to respond to reinterpretation of Article 9, to prevent of armed conflict, and to support peacebuilding. The significance of research argues that Japan plays an active leadership role across an abroad range of issues from human security to the R2P. Hence, the expected contribution of this research is adding a fresh insight analysis on Japan's foreign policy to current literature body. That task involves answering four questions:

- 1) Which is the most causal logic that explains Japan's foreign policy?
- 2) How do the rise of China to cause and effect on Japan's foreign policy?
- 3) What does this mean for Japan's support for the R2P and what role can Japan play in an altering foreign policy?
- 4) Does the evidence support these questions relating to US's "Pivot to Asia" policy?

II. Japan's Foreign Policy and Its Policy of Human Security to R2P

On 18 December 1956, Japan accomplished its long-desired goal of joining the United Nations, as the 80th Member State. For Japan, it can be regarded as indicators of Japan re-engage the international community since the Second World War.⁷ Since then, United Nations policy has remained one of the major components of Japanese diplomacy. Foreign Minister of Japan Kishi Nobusuke declared that Japan's foreign policy would focus on the three pillars of: cooperation with other democracies, maintaining a position as a member of Asia, and UN-centrism.⁸

Over the past 50 years, the foreign policy of Japan founded during 1950-2000 in power has been embedded "the Yoshida Doctrine." This doctrine was described among many: (1) Japan's economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal; political-economic co-operation with the United States was necessary for this purpose;

⁷ Christopher M. Dent, *China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia* (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), p. 191.

⁸ *Ibid.*

(2) Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues; (3) To gain a Japan's Foreign Policy in Transition long-term guarantee of its own security, Japan would provide assistances for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.⁹

During the Cold War, Japan was as important to the U.S. as the U.S. was to Japan. Japan played an important role in U.S.'s containment policy against the Communist bloc. In 1990-1992, Japan became the world's largest ODA donor and formulated its first ODA Charter, a comprehensive document on Japan's mid-term to long-term assistance policy.¹⁰ In other words, Japan's foreign activeness played a passive and strong supporting role in an international political arena.

However, the Gulf War is a symbol of Japan's re-engagement in international military affairs. The Gulf War that broke out on February 6, 1991 triggered a process of change of Japan's foreign policy. Citing Constitutional constraints Japan refused to "put boots on the ground," which angered the U.S., from the president down to shrill public opinion.¹¹ Gradually, both of Japan and the United States recognized the necessity of Japan's international military participation. Table I depicts this relationship by some Joint Declaration and Guidelines. In fact, Japan's diplomatic line presents a two-track parallel policy in the aftermath of the Gulf War. As shown in Table I and Table II, on the one hand with the United States military action to strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, on the other hand using the United Nations' human security policy continued its international assistance.

⁹ Bert Edström, "The Yoshida Doctrine in Unchartered Waters," in Bert Edström ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy in Transition: The Way Forward for Japan as an International Actor in a World in Flux* (Stockholm-Nacka: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011), pp. 6-20; Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan, the World, and the Twenty-first Century," in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., *The Political Economy of Japan. Volume 2: The Changing International Context* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 454.

¹⁰ The ODA Charter showed the basic blueprint of Japan's assistance: (1) humanitarian considerations; (2) recognition of interdependence among nations; (3) environmental conservation; and (4) support for the self-help efforts of developing countries towards economic take-off. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The Track Record of Japan's ODA," in MOFA ed., *Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2014* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015), Ch. 1.

¹¹ Bert Edström, "The Yoshida Doctrine in Unchartered Waters," in Bert Edström ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy in Transition: The Way Forward for Japan as an International Actor in a World in Flux* (Stockholm-Nacka: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011), pp.16-17.

Table I. Milestones in the U.S.-Japan Alliance Policy

1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security
1997 Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation
2004 Dispatch of SDF to Iraq
2009 Dispatch of MSDF for anti-piracy activities outside Africa
2015 The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

Table II. Milestones in Japan’s Human Security Policy

1992 Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter
1998 21st Century Foreign Policy Challenges
1999 Trust Fund for Human Security
2001 Commission on Human Security
2003 Revision of Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter

In response to the end of the Cold War and the increasing pace of globalization, the concept of human security has taken on greater importance in global politics, institutions, and governance.¹² Human security fits together with Japan’s framework to foreign affairs, which has been shaped by its pacifist constitution. Meantime, Japan was one of the first countries to support this new concept of security, with Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama explicitly acknowledging the concept in 1995.¹³ In 1998, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced that human security would play a guiding role in Japan’s foreign policy. Hereafter, Japan initiated the establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, and also supported the Commission on Human Security, which was co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, former United Nations high commissioner for refugees and president of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).¹⁴

Especially, human security was equated as a basic policy in the 2003 revision of

¹² In 1994, the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR) presented a new way of thinking about the integration of security issues and globalization. This report defined human security according to seven dimensions: personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health, and food security. The notion of human security as freedom from want has been promoted by Japan, and has been promoted as freedom from fear by Canada, Norway and members of the Human Security Network, HSN. Yu-tai Tsai, “The Emergence of Human Security: A Constructivist View,” *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2009), pp. 19-33.

¹³ “Human security starts at home,” *Fukushima Global Communications Programme*, Feb. 02, 2012, <http://fgc.unu.edu/en/publications/articles/human-security-starts-at-home.html>

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Japan's ODA Charter. During the 1990s and 2000s, human security has not been as prominent in Japan's foreign policy, but is still a central part of its ODA.¹⁵ Following the East Japan Earthquake of 2011, Japan received great support from 174 countries and regions worldwide, including developing countries. This can be seen as a success and expression of gratitude for Japan's contributions through ODA.¹⁶

Japan is considered a major contributor to both the intellectual mainstreaming of the concept and the implementation of human security through its financial support.¹⁷ Japan follows the theoretical track in the field of human security to support its research, as well as, takes the practical track of concrete action. These two tracks are for:¹⁸ (1) The Commission on Human Security and for (2) The Official Development Assistance and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.¹⁹ Japan regarded Human Security as an instrumental discourse and Human security has also become a criterion in Japan's ODA distribution.²⁰

However, mentioned above Japan's two-track parallel policy has an intersection with the emergence of R2P. In order to enhance discourse of power of the R2P, at the General Assembly Plenary Meeting 24 July 2009, Japan embraced the UN R2P proposal again and viewed the R2P as one element of human security. Japan emphasized the R2P needs to be better understood, strongly supported and implemented properly. At the same time, Japan welcomes this opportunity and supports the continued consideration by the Assembly to promote further this important concept.²¹

Traditionally, Japan has been wary of manipulating human security with the use

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's Foreign Policy to Promote National and Worldwide Interests," *Diplomatic Bluebook 2014* (Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2014/html/chapter3/inter_oda.html

¹⁷ Daniel Clausen, "Japan and Human Security: A Powerful Discourse or a Useful Coping Mechanism?" *Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies*, Oct. 31, 2009, <http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/2009/Clausen.html>

¹⁸ Corinna Konrad, "The Japanese Approach: Tracks of Human Security Implementation," *Human Security Perspectives*, Vol. 1, Issue 3 (2006), pp. 22.

¹⁹ The Trust Fund for Human Security was established by Japan's initiative in the United Nations in 1999, and as of August 2009, Japan has contributed approximately 346.58 million USD to the fund and 195 projects were implemented in 118 countries. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the "Human-centered" 21st Century* (Tokyo: Global Issues Cooperation Division (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), 2009).

²⁰ Corinna Konrad, "The Japanese Approach: Tracks of Human Security Implementation," *Human Security Perspectives*, Vol. 1, Issue 3 (2006), pp. 22-38.

²¹ Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, "Statement by H.E. Ambassador Yukio Takasu, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, On the Responsibility to Protect," July 24, 2009, <http://www.un.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/takasu072409.html>

of coercive force for Article 9 clause of Constitution. In other words, Japan does not intervene by force but has primarily focused on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.²² However, it's notably that Abe government committed Japan to play a more proactive role in the wake of Japan's decision not to withdraw its troops from South Sudan in 2013; continuing on this trend, on 10 February 2015, Abe Cabinet adopted a provision that allows Japanese monetary assistance to foreign troops. The new aid charter presented a broader definition of development to enclose post-conflict peacebuilding, promotion of basic human rights, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.²³ It is not just the broadening of the R2P agenda into development space which provided a 'Niche' for Japan to support R2P, but also changes in Japan's traditional development and security policy which render Japan evolving its security policy with the spectrum of R2P.²⁴

As shown in Table III, it highlights the relevance of Japan's foreign policy from 1950 to now. Among them, it's a tricky that from the contents of the 2013-2015 SCC Joint Statement and 2015 The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,²⁵ it stresses that the alliance of the U.S. and Japan toward a cooperation in international activities, including traditional security (military cooperation) and non-traditional security (HA/DR); on the contrary, from human security to the R2P policies imply that Japan's foreign policy is altering from non-traditional security to traditional security.

Japan's R2P Policy depicts that Japan's role has shifted in an altering foreign policy. It symbolizes that compared to human security policy; Japan's foreign policy now is changing to more dynamic and doughty by implementing R2P Policy. It is undeniable that combined with the New Guidelines (2015), R2P policy offers Japan a reasonable ground to effort for peace and stability of Japan. In the future, it is possible for Japan to alter its foreign policy to engage for armed intervention.

²² Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 381.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 382-383.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

²⁵ For more extended information, see available the contents of the *2013-2015 SCC Joint Statement* and *2015 The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation* online at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/ (accessed Sep. 20, 2016)

Table 3 The Evolution of Japan’s Foreign Policy

Japan’s Foreign Policy	Three Pillars of Kishi Nobusuke	the Yoshida Doctrine	Human Security Policy	R2P Policy
Time	1950 to 1956	1950 to 2000	1998 to Now	2005 to Now
Substantive Participation	The alliance of U.S. and Japan The second largest donor in UN system Provide assistances for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force		Japan’s ODA distribution/ humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)	post-conflict peacebuilding, promotion of basic human rights, humanitarian assistance
Core of Value	Efforts for Peace and Stability of Japan	political-economic co-operation with the United State	Response to Global Issues	states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations
Practical policy	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (1996) Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997/2015) Dispatch of SDF/MSDF(2004/2009) SCC Joint Statement(2013-2015)		Japan’s ODA Charter (1992) 21st Century Foreign Policy Challenges (1998) Trust Fund for Human Security (1999) Commission on Human Security (2001) Statement on the R2P (2009) Revision of Japan’s ODA Charter (2013)	
Significance for change	Traditional security and now from traditional security altering to non-traditional security		Non-traditional security	From non-traditional security altering to traditional security

III. The Factor of China’s Rise and Japan’s Foreign Policy

It’s assured that Sino-US factors deeply affected Japan’s foreign policy. Japan’s China policy has shifted over the past several decades within a complex Japan-US-China trilateral strategy.²⁶ Japan did not restore diplomatic ties with the PRC until 1972. However, the definition of “friendship” result was by good will on US’s policy. Since the 1970s, the United States shared a strategic interest in containing the Soviet Union as a common threat and that Japan also had commercial

²⁶ Tsuneo Watanabe, “Japan’s Security Strategy toward the Rise of China from a Friendship Paradigm to a Mix of Engagement and Hedging,” *The Japan Foundation*, April 06, 2015, <http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/security-strategy-toward-rise-of-china>

interests in mainland China's potentially enormous market.²⁷ In the 1990s, although profitable feelings toward China declined clearly following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, economic attractiveness still played a major core in Japan's continuation of economic cooperation.²⁸ With the China's growing military and Japan's shift toward "Normalcy" in the end of 1990s, the Sino-Japanese relations have a negative change. That negative change presented drastically in the mid-1990s after a series of situations strained Sino-Japanese relations, including Japan's cancellation of part of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China for China's 1995 nuclear tests, The Taiwan Strait Missile Test Crisis (1995-1996), and the U.S.-Japan decision in 1996 to revise defense guidelines, which allow Japan to assist the United States in a Korean Peninsula or Taiwan Strait peripheral contingency.²⁹

The Japanese perception of China has gone from bad to worse through a series of events that created mutual distrust in the 2000s and early 2010s.³⁰ The turning point was 2010 after the fishing boat collision near the Senkaku Islands; in the meantime, the U.S. and Japan moved swiftly to warn China to refrain from escalating territorial tensions in the East China Sea, after Beijing established an ADIZ over the East China Sea ("ECS ADIZ").³¹ ECS ADIZ directly promoted to further US-Japan cooperation. Both have coordinated at a high level their individual and collective responses to China's ECS ADIZ announcement and have reaffirmed the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance.³²

Undoubtedly, with the rise of China, the military posture and actions of China posed a potential threat to Japan's environmental security. According to the National Statistics Bureau of China, its defense budget announced in March 2016 was approximately 954.4 billion yuan (\$145 billion).³³ On August 2, Japan's Ministry of

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Michael Green and Benjamin Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 35-58.

²⁹ Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittney Farrar, "Through Beijing's Eyes: How China Sees the U.S.-Japan Alliance," *The National Interest*, May 12, 2015,

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/through-beijings-eyes-how-china-sees-the-us-japan-alliance-12864>

³⁰ Tsuneo Watanabe, "Japan's Security Strategy toward the Rise of China from a Friendship Paradigm to a Mix of Engagement and Hedging," *The Japan Foundation*, April 06, 2015,

<http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/security-strategy-toward-rise-of-china>

³¹ Yuka Hayashi and Jeremy Page, "U.S., Japan Rebuke China in Island Dispute," *The Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 24, 2013,

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304465604579217502123899812>

³² Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias, "China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)," *CRS Report*, No. R43894 (January 2015), p. 18.

³³ "China Plans Oceanic 'Space Station' in South China Sea," *The Washington Post*, June 09, 2016, <http://washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docId=1376-O723OT6KLV801-4F19M1R772ILNU0PIOC6>

Defense (MoD) announced its annual Defense White Paper and concerned over China's activities in the South China Sea which has triggered a regional Military tensions.³⁴ The 484-page Paper, 60 pages longer than last year's defense white paper, lists various Chinese intruding into the waters around the Japanese-occupied Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Under Abe's leadership, the ruling party in September pushed through parliament legislation that allows Japan's military to fight overseas and Japan has approved a record 5.05-trillion-yen (41.90-billion-U.S. dollar) military budget for the 2016 fiscal year, which the highest one since World War II.³⁵

Obviously, Japan's foreign policy is subject to the rise of China factor. China's rapid strengthening of military force which lacks transparency and attempts to change the status quo in the Asia. Peaceful development of China should be welcomed for Japan as well as for the Asian international system.³⁶ However, a series of military developments in China, as seen prominently in recent years, raises concern in the region and the entire international community. For instance, Good Japan-U.S. relations emphasize that China is a threat and the Alliance the way to face it.³⁷ The rise of China is a vital challenge for Japan. In the past year, the Abe Government has raised Japan's international prestige and profile to new heights. Abe provides the chance to build a greater strategic role for Japan in the Asia-Pacific and world. The significant development is to deepen foreign ties with United State and enhance the quality of their defense dialogue and strengthen the defense engagement between the USA and India.

For instance, Abe's visit to the India is part of a hectic foreign policy schedule. In early January 2014, Abe made a successful visit to India, where he and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to elevate their dialogue to a "Special Strategic and Global Partnership."³⁸ The most striking part of the visit was the two leaders'

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³⁴ Franz-Stefan Gady, "Japan's Defense White Paper Highlights Growing Threat From China," *The Diplomat*, August 02, 2016,

<http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/japans-defense-white-paper-highlights-growing-threat-from-china/>

³⁵ "Japan defense budget to exceed 5 trillion yen in 2016/17," *Reuters*,

<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence-budget-idUSKBN0U704N20151224>

³⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2016* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2016), p. 3.

³⁷ Guibourg Delamotte, "China and the United States as 'Alternatives' in the Diplomacy of the Democratic Party of Japan," in Bert Edström ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy in Transition: The Way Forward for Japan as an International Actor in a World in Flux* (Stockholm-Nacka: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011), p. 21.

³⁸ "Tokyo Declaration for India — Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership," *The Times of India*,

enthusiastic embrace upon greeting each other in Kyoto, demonstrating strong bonds of mutual respect and friendship. The India-Japan Joint Statement referred to the “Indo-Pacific”, officially bringing this strategic phrase into the China containment policy of lexicon.³⁹

IV. The Relevance of Japan’s New Foreign Policy and US’s Pivot to Asia Policy

The pre-September 11 Asian security environment had been shaped by some factors: the rise of China and the balance of power for Sino-US rivalry; the political and strategic fallout of the Asian economic crisis; and the emergence of regional multilateral cooperation, with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).⁴⁰ Of the many shifts, the following are important alteration: China’s economic and diplomatic consequences; the East Japan Earthquake of 2011, U.S.’s Pivot to Asia Policy, and North Korean nuclear tested; Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation; terrorist activities; the growth of new security challenges, widening gaps between rich and poor, pandemic rise of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation, organized crime, and environmental problems.⁴¹

From security studies perspective, the history of above these processes is reflected in the evolution of security-related concepts, namely comprehensive security, cooperative security and human security. The Asia is becoming increasingly interactive and enmeshed in a growing new order of interdependence. The emerging order is also characterized by the impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.⁴² Besides, these above different concepts were aimed at broadening the notion of security beyond the conventional state-centric and military-oriented security of a state. These concepts had been crafted by a number of actors, both state and non-state, who have at various points been engaged in the various processes of broadening the

Sep. 1, 2014,
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Tokyo-Declaration-for-India-Japan-Special-Strategic-and-Global-Partnership/articleshow/41433328.cms>

³⁹ Arun Mohan Sukumar, “A shift from style to substance,” *The Hindu*, December 16, 2015,
<http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/modis-foreign-policy-a-shift-from-style-to-substance/article7987958.ece>

⁴⁰ Amitav Acharya, “Terrorism and Security in Asia: Redefining Regional Order,” *Working Paper*, No. 113 (Perth, Australia: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 2004).

⁴¹ Nick Bisley, “Still Anchoring an American Asia Pacific,” in Camilleri et al. eds., *Asia-Pacific Geopolitics. Hegemony vs. Human Security* (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007), p. 50.

⁴² Amitav Acharya, “Terrorism and Security in Asia: Redefining Regional Order,” *Working Paper*, No. 113 (Perth, Australia: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 2004).

concepts that were reflective of the security concerns in the region, as well as in the rethinking of security approaches to advance these ideas.⁴³

Japan faces an increasingly severe security environment in East Asia. Besides, it encounters dilemma regarding how to deal with the current impasse between the option of pursuing a normative state and keeping a unique civilian humanitarian power. Coincidentally, the discourse of human security and R2P give Japan two tool for promoting the position among nations.⁴⁴ The strength of US-Japanese ties was demonstrated not only in the rapid U.S. response to the non-traditional security disaster in Japan (earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis), but also the day-to-day management of alliance issues (U.S.'s pivot to Asia policy) on both sides of the Pacific.⁴⁵ The U.S.'s military and diplomatic 'pivot', or 'rebalance' toward Asia became a popular buzzword after Hillary Clinton authored America's Pacific Century, in *Foreign Policy*.⁴⁶ The policy emphasizes the importance of the Asia-Pacific, noting that nearly half of the world's population resides there, making its development vital to American economic and strategic interests. She states that open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology.⁴⁷

Japan is a major area of partner for the East Asian foreign policy of the Obama Administration. In Hillary Clinton's inaugural tour of East Asia, she reassured Japanese officials of Japan's centrality in the network of American alliances.⁴⁸ In addition to anti-terrorism, the North Korean threat, rise of China, and uncertainty regarding the U.S. commitment to the alliance as big reasons for Japan's reconsideration of its role in the world. As Abe mentioned, "the world is increasingly a dangerous place and you can't simply try to avoid that."⁴⁹ In other words,

⁴³ Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Southeast Asia's Points of Convergence on International Intervention," in Sorpong Peou ed., *Human Security in East Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 65.

⁴⁴ Daniel Clausen, "Japan and Human Security: A Powerful Discourse or a Useful Coping Mechanism?" *Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies*, Oct. 31, 2009, <http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/2009/Clausen.html>

⁴⁵ Kurt Campbell and Brian Andrews, "Explaining the US 'Pivot' to Asia," *Chatham House*, August 2013, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf

⁴⁶ Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/>

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Peter Alford, "Clinton Reaffirms Japanese Alliance," *The Australian*, February 02, 2009, <https://www.pressreader.com/australia/the-australian/20090217/281758445188509>

⁴⁹ Eleanor Albert, "Japan's Hard Power Play/ Interviewee: Michael Auslin," *Council on Foreign Affairs*, February 16, 2015, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/japans-hard-power-play>

Washington is pleased with Tokyo's push for military self-reliance, Abe's government is heading for a "delicate balancing act".⁵⁰

Therefore, Japan needs to modify—not only to protect its national interests, but also to work with its allies. These shifts are part of a larger move on Abe's part to modernize and normalize the Japanese military. Obviously, since returning to power in September 2012, Abe has pushed through a series of institutional, legal, diplomatic, and military reforms that are reshaping Japan's foreign policy and that promise to enhance Japan's regional role over the coming decade.⁵¹ Responding to rapid changes in the East Asia, especially the dramatic increase in China's power, Japan's foreign role has distanced from its postwar pacifism—which was predicated on a benign view of the international system—and unfolded a new, more realist foreign policy.⁵²

V. Conclusion

A stronger Japan has been a fixed goal for Washington's pivot to Asia policy. The U.S.-Japan relationship can be regarded as two prisms: policy and politics.⁵³ In policy side, Washington wants a stronger ally, who can handle the vast majority, if not all, of its own defense. Washington also wants an ally who is flexible and willing to cooperate with it more; who has the tools and experience; and who shares U.S. values in order to provide model for other nations to help confirm security and stability in Asia Pacific. Finally; therefore, a stronger Japan is in the interest of the United States. Japan can contribute to humanitarian operations and ultimately play a larger role in international political arena.⁵⁴

In the political side, the Obama administration and Abe's government are concerned about what role a more independent Japan might put on the stage in the region.⁵⁵ Indeed, more than ever, it's a good time for Japan to promote international peace and seize this opportunity. This paper sketches out that Japan plays an active leadership role across an abroad range of issues from human security to the R2P. Besides, Japan's foreign policy now is changing to more dynamic and doughty by implementing R2P Policy. It is undeniable that combined with the New Guidelines

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Michael Auslin, "Japan's New Realism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 95 Issue 2 (2016), pp. 125-135.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Eleanor Albert, "Japan's Hard Power Play/ Interviewee: Michael Auslin," *Council on Foreign Affairs*, February 16, 2015, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/japans-hard-power-play>

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

(2015), R2P policy offers Japan a hard power play to operate in coordination with U.S.'s grand strategy. Abe Shinzō has pledged to “take Japan back” from its constraining postwar regime. This evolving security system is accelerating the dilution of Japan’s pacifist norms.⁵⁶ In the future, it is possible for Japan to alter its foreign policy to engage in further armed intervention.

⁵⁶ Sebastian Maslow, “A Blueprint for a Strong Japan? Abe Shinzō and Japan’s Evolving Security System,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (2015), pp. 739-765.

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