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市民社会組織在高齢少子化社会之角色與功能：以日本老人福利推廣組織為例
高齢化社会における市民社会組織の役割と機能：
日本の高齢者社会福祉団体のケース・スタディ

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Abstract

This study sheds light on how the third sector developed for Japanese old people. It does so by asking two fundamental questions: First, what are the structural forces which result in the fact that there is no giant CSO for the elderly in the super-aged Japanese society? Second, what strategies have these Japanese CSOs taken for their capacity building and organizational development?

Two arguments can be concluded in this study. First, the number of Japanese CSOs has increased but none of them become as dominant as their counterparts in the USA or UK. External factors such as political institutions, economic considerations, social arrangements, and cultural values in Japan and internal development within the organizational field of old people's CSOs can both offer explanation. The state and its regulatory frameworks, together with the Japanese political institutions, have profoundly shaped the development of civil society and thus influenced CSOs' operation. The Long Term Care Insurance scheme as the privatization of social welfare has channeled the approach of CSOs and exemplified such dynamics.

The second argument contends that even within the same organizational field, Japanese CSOs for the elderly neither actually cooperate with each other nor fight against each other for resources. Instead, they have respectively constructed their own networks from which their capacity to activate resources and generate income can be developed. More specifically, WHO's holistic "Active Ageing" policy framework has also benefitted CSOs who are now endorsed by WHO. Under the "Active Ageing" framework, these CSOs have a clearer self-identification, a powerful statement to seek for legitimacy and to strengthen social network in their campaign. Their inter-organizational social capital with stakeholders is therefore enhanced, which in return consolidates the equivalence of the organizational field-no CSO stands out above the rest.

1. Introduction

Ours is an ageing society. With more and more senior citizens entering their later life actively and healthily, their growing demands are considered significantly but differently by governments, private sectors, and civil society organizations (hereinafter abbreviated as CSOs). Among them, the third sectors are highlighted in this study as they are usually of greater importance for the disadvantaged groups. The ways by which such CSOs empower the elderly can be identified in many programmes, among which “Active Ageing” programmes such as sports/leisure services are quite common since it is generally believed that sports/leisure participation is beneficial to the physical, psychological, and social well-being of the elderly. Sports/leisure programmes for old people can therefore be thought as the embodiment of “Active Ageing” policy framework.

The target of this study is CSOs promoting “Active Ageing” programmes for the elderly. The emergence of such CSOs can be considered as an alternative to governments and private sectors by which an ageing society responds to the individual demands. The content by which such CSOs empower the elderly can be identified in many programmes such as transportation, food delivery, financial management, pension plans, insurances...etc. Images of senior clients’ leisure/sports participation, however, are predominantly found in such CSOs’ campaign. The purpose of this research, therefore, is to understand the meaning of such CSOs in an ageing society and their strategy in terms of legitimacy and social capital. The concepts of New Institutionalism can help to understand the institutional environment where such CSOs are embedded, and the notions from Social Capital Theory can help to explain why leisure/sports images and programmes are widely used by such CSOs in their campaign.

Japanese CSOs serving the elderly, both at the grassroots and national levels, are cases in this study as their existence has embodied the convergence of Japanese civil society and ageing society. At the grassroots level, a CSO in KAWASAKI City is studied; at the national level, two CSOs, one umbrella organization of old people’s CSOs are investigated. Moreover, a joint innovative project among the University of Tokyo (hereinafter abbreviated as TODAI) and its stakeholders from the public, private, and civil society sectors is also introduced in this study as it is a ground-breaking initiative and will definitely influence the scenario of Japan’s ageing society in the coming future. Although at this moment this project is at the experimental stage and CSOs do not play major a role, one of the missions for TODAI to launch such initiative is to share its know-how with CSOs so that they can be empowered in the future based on knowledge/experiences generated in this joint project.

Both statistic data and qualitative methods are used to investigate these cases. With an ethnographic approach, the techniques for data collecting include in-depth interviews,

participant observation, and content analysis. Based on a comparative analysis approach, this study aims to identify the rationales of these CSOs' emergence and the ways by which these CSOs seek for legitimacy and construct their inter-organizational social capital.

Up to date, the rapidly ageing Japanese society has witnessed its fastest ageing rate in the world, with the percentage of Japanese population aged 65 and over rising from 7% to 14% in 24 years. Likewise, Taiwan has encountered similar demographic change. By investigating CSOs' contribution to ageing society, this project is especially timely to address the importance of such CSOs and help policy makers to formulate appropriate proposals for the changing demographic trends. Moreover, since Japan and Taiwan have been closely connected in many regards and both of them share similar demographic trends, it is hoped that this project can add to the mutual understanding and future cooperation between Japanese and Taiwanese CSOs for the elderly.

2. Conceptualizing CSOs for the elderly

2.1 CSOs and CSOs serving the elderly in Japan

The classification of CSOs in Japan is in debate (Ohta, 2005) and this study does not aim to draw any conclusion in this issue. Instead, the purpose of this study is to understand how Japanese social forces (as opposed to public and private forces) deal with challenges and opportunities of population ageing. For this reason, this study takes a broader definition of CSOs. According to Walzer (1995: 8), civil society can be defined as “the space of uncoerced human associations... and the set of relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology—that fill this space”. This highlights CSOs' feature of being organized and echoes Schmitter's (1986: 6) concept of “institutionalized social pluralism”.

Aspects highlighted in this study are as follows: the CSOs' governance structure, financial support, marketing/campaign (to attract senior clients), and human resources management, the R&D of programmes for the elderly. Nursing homes, however, are excluded in this research though they are a form of CSOs for the elderly in the Japanese context. Since institutional care is different from community care, this study only focuses on CSOs involved in the latter so that comparability among selected cases can be found. More specifically, CSOs providing community care services feature in “Active Ageing” in their campaign. “Active Ageing” is therefore an issue to be elaborated later in this section.

In Japan, many CSOs for the elderly are involved in the Long Term Care Insurance (hereinafter abbreviated as LTCI) system as it is a good way for their financial support in the institutional environment. LTCI was launched in 2000 and since then has been the

most influential institution in terms of population ageing (Suda, 2006). According to the Health, Labour, and Welfare Statistic Association (2009), NPOs shared 4.6% of the LTCI care service for the elderly in 2007. But the amount of NPOs involved has climbed tremendously from 667 in 2001 to 2996 in 2007, a 349% increase. In other words, though the proportion of NPOs in LTCI is relatively low at this moment but it has witnessed a prosperous growth. This study focuses on the emerging sector in the Japanese population ageing arena and can be thought as a pilot study for the organizational ecology of old people's NPOs in Japan.

NPOs are generally meant to be organizations who are not activated for the purpose of profit (Deans & Ware, 1986). According to Salamon and Anheier's (1997: 33) structural-operational approach, NPOs can be defined as "a collection of entities that are: organized, private, non-profit-distributing, self-governing, and voluntary", and such criteria are adopted in this study. In Japan, the 1995 HANSHIN earthquake marks a milestone for the development of NPOs. Many civil society organizations which were not recognized as juridical persons actually devoted themselves in the relief and after that they appealed to the Japanese government for the reduction of strict limit on the establishment of civil society organizations. "Special Nonprofit Organization Law" was consequently passed in 1998. (Hirata, 2002).

While growing interest in NPOs can be identified academically, relevant studies largely take the perspective of a single theoretical approach. For example, NPOs are the main subject in Schneiberg and Clemens's (2006) investigation about institutionalization, and the growth of NPOs is interpreted by Saxton and Benson (2005) within the concept of Social Capital Theory. The author of this research believes, however, that combining several theoretical approaches could help to draw a complete picture of the field. This study attempts to understand the forces of such NPOs' emergence and the mechanism of their social network/capital construction through their "Active Ageing" campaign. Thereby, New Institutionalism and Social Capital Theory are the main theoretical frameworks while "Active Ageing" can work as the underlying policy discourse. In terms of NPO's agency within structures, the contrasting ideas of New Institutionalism and Social Capital Theory suggest that further research is necessary as this issue is still highly debated.

2.2 Active Ageing

According to Walker (2002), three stages can be found in the development of discourses about "Active Ageing". The first version, "Successful Ageing", was initially proclaimed in the 1960s as opposed to Disengagement Theory but was criticized for homogenizing the diversity of old people. Next, "Productive Ageing" emerged in the 1980s with ageing being narrowly interpreted economically. "Active Ageing" was then promoted by WHO

in the 1990s who defined it as “the process of optimizing opportunities for health, participation and security in order to enhance quality of life as people age” (WHO, 2002: 12). Health, security and participation are among the three pillars of WHO’s “Active Ageing” policy framework, and the last one is further elaborated on as “continuing participation in social, economic, cultural, spiritual and civic affairs, not just the ability to be physically active or to participate in the labour force” (ibid: 12). It can therefore be concluded that the passive needs-based approach has been transformed into an active rights-based approach in WHO’s “Active Ageing”.

For WHO itself, “Active Ageing” refers to the “active way of spending increased free time after retirement” (Avramov & Maskova, 2003: 24). But how will WHO’s holistic approach be interpreted and practiced by organizations in the front line of service, such as CSOs for the elderly? The ways by which these CSOs empower the elderly can be identified in many programmes such as transportation, food delivery, financial management, and insurance. Moreover, images of senior clients’ sports /leisure participation can also be found in such CSOs’ “Active Ageing” campaigns. Since old peoples’ sports/leisure participation is generally believed to be beneficial to their physical, psychological, and social well-being, it can therefore be thought as the embodiment of an “Active Ageing” policy framework (Department of Health, 2001; Walker, 2002; Social Exclusion Unit, 2006).

As noted by Weeks (2005, p.336), the interval between retirement and death can be described as “a time of leisurely retirement”. The academic community has paid much attention to this, highlighting sports/leisure programmes provided to senior citizens. However, a surprisingly large number of studies feature the typology of old people’s sports/leisure participation (Agahi, 2008) even though a universal typology is hardly found. Since different socio-cultural contexts have various concepts and practices about “leisure” (Warnes, 2006), this study will not try to understand why such inconsistencies exist. Instead, it will attempt to compensate for gaps on the part of organizations since it is the organizations from which leisure services for the elderly are derived.

2.3 New Institutionalism

The target of this research is NPOs serving the elderly. With its lens of legitimacy and institutional isomorphism, New Institutionalism can be used to explain the emergence and development of NPOs. Selznick (1957) indicates that organizations are influenced by the external environment. Meyer and Rowan (1977) believe institutionalization is a process by which organizations keep adopting taken-for-granted social facts such as laws, cultural expectations, and social norms from the institutional environment. The consequence of institutionalization, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), is institutional isomorphism by which organizations can earn legitimacy. Coercive, mimetic,

and normative forces are the three forces of institutional isomorphism summarized by DiMaggio and Powell, and these forces work under different circumstances even in the same organizational field. They also claim that institutional isomorphism can be found more easily among organizations with vaguer goals since it is hard for them to find a powerful statement to support their existence and striving for resources. This is also true for NPOs in this study.

Unlike Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) believe that organizational behaviors and structures are not thoroughly determined by the institutional environment, and highlight the networking in the organizational field. This is consistent with Social Networks Theory. Actually, the studies of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Han (1994) can be thought of as the convergence of Social Networks Theory and New Institutionalism. However, their analyzed unit remains the institutional environment, and actors within organizations are still ignored. Accepting the fact that institutions themselves may change, Hirsch (1986) examines the process of institutional transformation and takes into consideration the actors' agency.

As the base of legitimacy, shared concepts are usually transmitted by networks which vary from organization to organization. Nevertheless, it is still possible that organizations with different networks can benefit from shared social capital as "a form of collective good" (Putnam, Pharr & Dalton, 2000:26). The lack of microscopic viewpoints in New Institutionalism has been criticized academically (Stinchcombe, 1997), and Social Capital Theory, with its microscopic perspectives, should be applied to answer question about "how collective action is jointly achieved by cultural, social, and institutional factors" (Petersen, Roepstor, & Serritzlew, 2009: 75).

2.4 Social Capital Theory

Within the framework of social capital networks, Social Capital Theory can help to explain the underlying rationales and approaches based on which NPOs attempt to construct social capital through "Active Ageing" programmes in their campaigns.

Three major streams of "Social Capital Theory" can be found. The first, by Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1990), considers social capital at the individual level. The second, with its analysis at the societal level, is Putnam's (1993a and 1993b) approach which links civic engagement and social capital. These two are not applicable in this study because what is highlighted here is the inter-organizational social capital among NPOs with "Active Ageing" programmes for the elderly in Japan.

The third considers social capital as a form of capital embedded in the actor's social network. Based on Granovetter's (1985) concepts of "social embeddedness" and Burt's (1992) notion of "structural holes", Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 251) further developed

three dimensions of “inter-organizational” social capital. Their measurement of inter-organizational social capital can be summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 The measurement of inter-organizational social capital in this study

Dimensions	Elements
Structural dimension	Network ties, network configuration, appropriable organizations
Cognitive dimension	Shared codes and language, shared narratives
Relational dimension	Trust, norm, obligation, identification

This approach, which considers organizations as actors embedded in their social relationships and focuses on relations and resources, is echoed by Gabbay and Leenders (1999). The inter-organizational social capital is termed as “corporate social capital” by Gabbay and Leenders (1999: 3) and is defined as “the set of resources, tangible or virtual, that accrue to a corporate player through the player’s social relationships, facilitating the attainment of goals”. Additionally, according to Lin (2001), social capital often accompanies social networks and can be defined as “resources embedded in one’s social networks, resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks” (Lin, 2001: 39).

To sum up, such a network-based definition and dimensions of social capital can be used to examine individual NPOs’ social capital within their social networks and explain the unequal development in the organizational field. Based on the aforementioned theoretical foundations this study will then try to answer two questions as follows: “why there is no giant CSO for the elderly in the super-aged Japanese society?” and “why is inter-organizational social capital important to CSOs in Japan?”

3. Why there is no giant CSO for the elderly in a super-aged Japanese society?

In this research, four core organizations are the cases studied: two CSOs at the national level (CSO A and B), one at the local grassroots level (CSO D), and one joint project among TODAI and its partners in the public and private sectors (CSO C)¹. Moreover, as this study examines these organizations’ background and their relationship with partners, their respective stakeholders are also interviewed. Coding examples and descriptions are elaborated in Table 2.

¹ It is still in debate if the university should be considered as NPO or CSO. See, for example, Salamon and Anheier (1997), Oleck and Stewart (1994), among many others. A broader definition of CSOs and NPOs are applied in this study, the joint project with TODAI as the core node is therefore taken as case study in this research.

Table 2 Coding in this study

CSOs A-D	Actors (CSO itself or its stakeholders)	Number
A, B, C, D	C: Commercial companies who are CSOs A-D's for-profit partners G: CSOs A-D's Government partners H: Heads in CSOs A-D M: CSOs A-D's Media partners N: CSOs A-D's NPO partners P: Political elites who are NPOs A-D's partners (in the parliament or local councils)	If there are more than one in each category, then numbers will be used to distinguish them. For example, AG1 and AG2 are both CSO A's government partners. However, as some interviewees work in the same organizations, the hyphen is used to identify those in the same organization. For example, CC1-1 and CC1-2 both work in CSO C's commercial partner company 1.
Another group is the experts and scholars who have done relevant research and have worked with any of these NPOs. ES1 means expert/scholar No.1.		

The first issue to be studied is highly related to the institutional environment where Japanese CSOs are embedded. Though Japan is famous for its being a super-aged society and there are some big NPOs or charities from abroad trying to establish a branch in Japan to serve the elderly (or to share the grey market), up to date it proves that such efforts do not work very well. American Association of Retired Persons (hereinafter abbreviated as AARP) representative in Tokyo and AgeUK representative in Osaka are two examples in this case. For the former, the AARP Global Network has been launched in 2006. The AARP itself and DaneAge Association from Denmark were the first two member organizations, with 50&Più from Italy and CARP from Canada joining in 2007 and ANBO from the Netherlands joining in 2008. All of them are dominant CSOs in their respective countries, have similar achievements/capacities, and thus can be eligible to join the network. But it is still difficult for AARP to set up a branch or find a partner CSO in Japan. The latter was the merger of two charities (Age Concern and Help the Aged) in the UK in 2010, and some CSOs are thinking to apply AgeUK's approach in Japan. But again such idea does not gain great popularity as Japanese CSOs for the elderly are still operated at a relatively small scale as opposed to their counterparts in the USA or UK. If population ageing offers a niche for the boom of old people's CSOs, why in a super-aged society there are no incentives for a giant CSO?

3.1 National monopolization of public benefit in Japan

Ohta (2004: 4) has applied Eiichi Hoshino's argument "national monopolism of public benefit" to describe the relationship between the state and civil society in Japan. As a Professor of Law in TODAI, Hoshino's insight can also be utilized to understand how institutional environment can influence the development of CSOs in Japan. After World War II, Japan's democracy had been established through external forces. While the progress of its constitutional institutions and democratic elections can be identified, the organized development of civil society is very slow. Hoshino's concept "national monopolism of public benefit" denotes the fundamental ideology of the unique Japanese civil society. Other scholars studying Japanese civil society have also pointed out that Japan basically had a relatively weak civil society before the 1990s as the public domain was almost monopolized by the state (Knight, 1996:224; Kawashima, 2001:6).

In other words, the unique political system allows the state to exclusively control the public domain, and thus leaves less legitimacy for Japanese civil groups to advocate for public interests. While CSOs' roles to participate in public affairs are not recognized widely by the society, limits from the state/regulation system again make it more difficult for the organized development of civil society in Japan. This is especially true when it comes to some issues which concern most old people: the health insurance and the pension system. In Japan, it is compulsory for each citizen to join the national health insurance provided by the state and the pension system is also well-established by the government. Compared to that, the American context makes it much easier for AARP to find its own legitimacy in the health insurance and pension issues. Given such institutional difference, it is understandable that there is little niche for giant CSOs for the elderly in Japan.

Focusing on the interaction between the Japanese government and its aging society, Campbell (1992) notices that population ageing as a profound social change has changed Japanese government policies in employment, pension, health care, and social service programs for the elderly. Four "modes" of decision making-cognitive, political, artifactual, and inertial- are applied by Campbell to understand how perception of social problems can be linked to strategic intervention and policy change, which are the results of conflicts and coalitions among different stakeholders to generate or channel political energy. Campbell's elaboration about how Japanese government undertakes its responsibility for the "aging-society problem" has demonstrated again the strong government control in Japan.

In his masterpiece "*Japan's Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates*", Pekkanen (2006) further explains why Japan's democratic pattern differs strikingly from other civil societies in the developed countries. With more small/local groups at the grassroots level but less large/ professional organizations at the national level, the unique democratic

participation in Japan is described as the phenomenon of “members without advocates” by Pekkanen (2006). He concludes that political institutions—the regulatory framework, financial flows, and political opportunity structure—account for this pattern. The consequence is that civil groups in Japan have less opportunity to participate in the national policy debates, not to mention substantial influences.

As many interviewees² in this study have reported, the premise for AARP’s prosperity in the American context is the government failure to address old people’s concerns (especially the health insurance and pension issues). In other words, there are gaps between the general public’s expectation and the government’s offer so that AARP can find a niche, both for its own legitimacy and resource activation. But these conditions do not exist in Japan. Moreover, the state regulatory system with its resource allocation agenda has directed the development of CSOs in Japan. The joint effect of these two factors is the phenomenon that there is no giant CSO for old people in the world’s oldest country.

Now that the structural rationale for such phenomenon is elucidated, this section will then shift to deal with two derivative issues: “how do these smaller CSOs interact with each other within the same organizational field?” and “why there is no incentive for their merger?”

3.2 Active Ageing: a collective action based on loose coupling organizational field

Although in Japan there are some umbrella organizations for old people’s CSOs such as the Japan NGO Council on Ageing (JANCA), each CSO has its own network and does not have substantial interaction with other counterparts. In other words, their interaction is either for formality reason (such as annual meeting) or for policy advocacy—the more CSOs involved, the more powerful their voices can be. In such a loose coupling organizational field where CSOs run their own business without intensive cooperation, however, a common feature among these CSOs can be identified. With their operation in their respective networks, these CSOs all have “Active Ageing” in their campaign.

Here, DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) idea about “institutional isomorphism” can offer some explanation. With vaguer goals, CSOs usually need to find a powerful statement for their legitimacy. Reviewing these CSOs’ “Active Ageing” campaigns, it can be summarized that three pillars of WHO’s “Active Ageing” policy framework (security, health, and participation) are all utilized by CSOs in this study. Participation, which is defined by WHO (ibid: 12) as “continuing participation in social, economic, cultural, spiritual and civic affairs, not just the ability to be physically active or to participate in the labour force” is especially popular. Health is another element which can be found frequently in these CSO’s “Active Ageing” campaign. Since sports and recreation

² Interviewees AH, BH1, BH2, ES1, ES2, and AN1 all know AARP and share similar idea in this issue.

participation is beneficial to old people physical, psychological, and social well-being, “Active Ageing” through sports/recreation participation and health promotion is a good strategy for these CSOs’ legitimacy.

However, DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) “institutional isomorphism” can not help to explain why different CSOs at various levels have different interpretations and practices of “Active Ageing”. Some other theories are needed here for our better understanding.

With regard to the relationship between the organization and environment, Resource Dependence Theory and Organizational Ecology have divergent viewpoints while both of them are based on perspectives of political economy (Hall, 1999). The former thinks positively about the organization’s active response to environment, resources accumulating, and control over their own fate. The latter, however, believes that organizations passively receive the environment’s selection of appropriate organization forms. This study does not try to figure out such debate but from the lance of resource mobilization there might be an alternative to understand the stratification of actors involved in “Active Ageing” issues, from the state to the CSOs.

The fact that old people can vote never changes, and politicians’ attention to the elderly thus never fades. For a better efficiency in resource activation, policy bonus which Japanese government offers its old citizens is an important support for CSOs, both administratively and financially. This also means what CSOs can do varies with the resource flow from the central government to the grassroots CSOs. As a policy framework from the state, LTCI has empowered CSOs what they can do and also limited what they can not do. CSOs thus shape their services in compliance with LTCI’s criteria for legitimacy and reimbursement (Suda, 2006). Since “health” and “participation” are more emphasized by the LTCI policy framework and “security” issue is far beyond single CSO’s capacity, it is more practical for CSOs to focus their limited resources on services which they are authorized to do and are capable of doing.

Except in TODAI’s joint project which really has the substantial national-level input from TODAI as a national university and UR as an independent semi-government agency, “security” is less practiced by other CSOs as its promotion and operation are much more complicated. Even CSO A and B are at national level, they have less capacity to run “security” programmes³ which feature TODAI’s joint project: housing, financial management, insurance, and so on, to name but a few. The aforementioned characteristics of Japanese politics (national monopolization of public benefit and a civil society without members’ advocates) can explain why even CSOs at the national level do not have adequate capacity and why the embodiment of “Active Ageing” policy framework by most CSOs in this study is more “health” and “participation” but less “security”. It can therefore be concluded that among the three forces of institutional isomorphism

³ With other CSOs, CSO A and B have advocacy in pension and labor policy reform.

summarized by DiMaggio and Powel (1983), it is first coercive then mimetic force which is functioning for CSOs which highlight “Active Ageing” images in their campaign.

To sum up, though “Active Ageing” is a shared feature among CSOs who do not really interact with each other, CSOs at different levels have practiced “Active Ageing” campaign in various ways. This is a political-economic consequence for CSOs after calculating the comparative institutional advantage. CSOs’ efficiency consideration can also be identified in the fact that there is a clear boundary among them and there is no incentive for merger.

3.3 Clear boundary with no merger

There are no structural incentives to merge or niche for a bigger CSO. There are, however, clear boundary among the CSOs who know each other but seldom interact with other. This can be considered as the informal norm in the organizational field of these CSOs.

Young man, I have tried these five years to network with other NPOs and then inscribe them into my scope, but after ten years of trial and error, it proves impossible in Japan... Japanese are not born to coop but to flight, or at least to live independently. No body wants to be subjugated. If you (leader of an NPO) have some achievement, do you want to give it away to others? Can you be persuaded to subordinate if you think your achievement to others? (AH)

These CSOs are aware of the difficulty of merger and lack of structural incentive for merger. In other words, network of these CSOs is a loose coupling one—each one knows it has its own territory and does not try to break the unwritten rules.

I have to be modesty that we are a small NPO without so many resources. And our initiative is not to compete against other NPOs but coop with them and offer our professional services. This is our niche which nobody can take it over. Only we are able do it in Japan. We have no plan to increase varieties of our programmes and we are happy about the cooperation with other NPOs. (BH2)

Before we tried hard to be at the national level but now we are happy just to be a local NPO and undertake outsourced projects from the government or other NPOs. Can you imagine how much (institutional) cost is needed in order to merge others? Ten years with debt and our members do not support this idea at all! It is not administratively efficient and economically smart. Staying at the local level I can do anything I am able to. (DH)

The network has inertia here as no one wants to influence or to be influenced.

Why? Because they are afraid that they do not have enough capacity even they are at national level. They lack self-confidence because they know the ecology of their industry—normally old people's CSOs do not collaborate very closely nor do they compete against each other seriously. They just find their own way to sustain themselves in their own world.

Comparative institutional advantage again explains CSOs' strategy to stay in the fragmented organizational field. They turn to manage their own social network and have benefited considerably from such investment.

We are careful not to get lost in the pursuit of funding and relevant compliances. That is too much. I mean we should return to the community and listen to voices of local old people. We decide to be self-sustained and our members support this idea. This does not mean that we do not welcome cooperation but we just want our autonomy. (DH)

Many people believe that we will become the Japanese version of AARP, but I am afraid it's just an illusion. We have no plan to increase our branches or make ourselves bigger. That is not what we want to do now. We prefer sharing our know-how with other NPOs. Our mission is that since we have more capacity than others, why not use it for something others can not do, like R&D in some innovative programmes which are good for our old people? (BH1)

Given that there is limited niche for old people's CSOs in Japan, how the organizational field looks like has been revealed here in this section. Since the mutual interaction among these CSOs forms a loose coupling organizational field, there must be some other platforms and channels for these CSOs to access resources and facilitate their operation. "How do Japanese CSOs for the elderly activate resources to sustain themselves?" is the next question to be answered.

4. Why is inter-organizational social capital important to CSOs in Japan?

Though CSOs in this study seldom interact with other old people's CSOs, they have much more and deeper interactions with their stakeholders within their own network. In other words, these CSOs' behavior in their organizational field is different from that in their embedded network. This reveals CSOs' agenda to construct their autonomy within structure and the alternative feasibility for their maintenance. Taking the four core CSOs

as the nodes in their respective network, this study then tries to investigate how inter-organizational social network and social capital can contribute to CSOs' development.

The three dimensions of “inter-organizational social capital” developed by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 251) is based on Granovetter's (1985) concepts of “social embeddedness” and Burt's (1992) notion of “structural holes”. Under structural dimension, there are elements such as network ties, network configuration, appropriable organizations; shared codes and language, shared narratives are elements within cognitive dimension; relational dimension features in trust, norm, obligation, and identification. This approach can be used to examine individual NPOs' social capital within their social networks and explain the unequal development in the organizational field. However, what is missing in relevant literatures is the patterns of inter-organizational social capital and the rationales behind various patterns. The major concern of this section is to deal with this issue and try to enrich existing theories.

4.1 The patterns of inter-organizational social capital

Networking, shared codes, trust, mutual interests and identification are perceived the most frequently by four CSOs and their stakeholders in this study. Different informants report at least three patterns of inter-organizational social capital as follows:


A. Linear (in a consecutive way)

One example is “mutual identification → shared codes → mutual interests → networking → trust”. Another example is “shared codes → networking → mutual identification → mutual interests → trust”. Even the same linear pattern, the order of elements may vary.

B. Concentric circle

One example is “trust → shared codes → mutual identification → networking → mutual interests” (from the centre to the periphery) while others have different orders of the elements. Figure 1 illustrates one example of the example of concentric circle.

Figure 1: One example of concentric circle




Note: red: trust; purple: shared codes; orange: mutual identification; green: networking; blue: mutual interests.

C. Pyramid

One example is as follows in Figure 2 while again there are still other perceptions about the order.

Figure 2: One example of pyramid



Overall, as this research focuses on four CSOs and their stakeholders, the existence of variables can not be denied as each actor is different, this is especially true when the order is concerned. What can be concluded from this study, however, is that with the development of CSOs, their networking becomes more complicated and non-linear patterns of inter-organizational social capital can be shaped.

4.2 Rationales behind different perceptions of inter-organizational social capital

There are two approaches to explain why the perception of inter-organizational social capital varies. The first is based on difference among the four core CSOs while the second is related with various relationships which they have constructed with their stakeholders.

A. Comparison of the four CSOs

As the four CSOs are quite different in many aspects, their respective inter-organizational social networks thus vary. One example is their networks' size—the amount of organizations tied with the core CSO (Podolny and Baron, 1997).

Compared to CSO C and D, CSO A and B have much more partners in their network. Though TODAI has resources at the national level, its pioneer joint project is now operated only in a community in CHIBA prefecture. As for CSO D, though its achievement is well-known and its leader is encouraged to transform it into a national-level CSO, up to date it remains at the local level and one reason is that its network is mainly within the same prefecture where it operates.

But how does network size influence CSOs' interpretation about their inter-organizational social capital? The mechanism stems from the fact that quantity does not equal to quality. Compared to CSO A and B, CSO C and D concentrate on fewer stakeholders and both report to have Linear as the pattern of their inter-organizational social capital.

For me, it is important to do things step by step. Because we are a small CSO in our local area, we do not have so many credits to exchange with others. Only when we have achieved one stage that we can move to the next stage. (DH)

Actually before we formally launched the project with UR and this local cram school⁴, we have tried to contact CSOs both at the national and local levels. But

⁴ Before TODAI launched the joint pioneering project, this cram school has already run its “elderly as social resources” programme where old people who have ever worked abroad and retired now are recruited as volunteers to teach children English. According to the founder of this cram school, the shared vision (old people are resources of the society) is the most important reason why TODAI chooses to cooperate with them.

unfortunately these CSOs show very low interest in our proposal...When we find this cram school which has similar idea with ours (old people as resources of the society), we know it is exactly what we want. So we contact them and build our relationship step by step. It costs us much effort to find suitable partners so we hope things to be developed in an appropriate speed. (CH3)

At the national level, CSO A and B do have more networks with partners from various backgrounds, at different levels, and in diverse geographic areas. The size of their network has influenced their networking strategy and thus their perceived inter-organizational social capital.

I have worked in this CSO for more than 20 years. So if you ask me to draw a map of all these (elements of inter-organizational social capital), then I would say at the beginning we might have simpler strategy for networking, just like a line. But now we have too many lines to maintain, we need a different strategy. (BH2)

As you know, we have so many partners to connect so we need a more systematic approach to manage so many ties. At the management level, I think it is much easier if I have this mind map (the concentric circle) to guide me every time when I need to interact with our partners. (AH)

It can be concluded that for efficiency reason, CSO A and B have developed a more systematic approach to maintain their networks and that is why their interpretation of inter-organizational social capital differs from that of their counterparts. But what if only one core CSO is analyzed, together with its stakeholders? As there are still differences among stakeholders of one specific CSO, in the next section influences of such difference on the dynamic inter-organizational relationship will be discussed.

B. Comparison of stakeholders of the same CSO

Even within the same network constructed by/surrounding the core CSO, different actors have various perceptions. There are some reasons to explain it.

a. the role of the actor

Roles of each actor will influence its expectation and interpretation. Is the actor the core CSO itself? The government who offers funding or just supervises the CSO without financial support? Or the private sector who seeks commercial interests from investing such networks? Actors with different roles have various expectations and agendas to participate in the network, and this ultimately influences their understanding about the inter-organizational social capital. Moreover, as one core CSO has diverse relations with

stakeholders in terms of density and duration, this also influences dynamics in inter-organizational social capital.

b. the position of the actor in the inter-organizational social network

Here the phenomenon can be analyzed from four aspects

b-1 individual actor's numbers of ties (Burt, 1992) or density (ties among alters or others) (Podolny and Baron, 1997)

b-2 if the actor is a node with structural holes (Burt, 1992)

b-3 the networks' depth (time to interact or the development of the interaction: beginning, middle, or mature stage of the relationship?) (Uzzi, 1999) or duration (time since networks are built) (Podolny and Baron, 1997)

b-4 breadth (the scope and amount of transaction) and the complementarities (Uzzi, 1999)

5. Conclusion

As a super-aged society and civil society without advocates in the democratic system, CSOs for the elderly in Japan are unique. Governance of these CSOs is studied in this research as the know-how of their management and operation is worth investigating and can inspire Taiwanese CSOs as both sides share similar political and socio-cultural backgrounds.

The state and its regulatory frameworks, such as the LTCI scheme, has profoundly influenced development of CSOs in Japan from the beginning of the 21st century. It proves that civil society sector and the state have become interdependent for their complementary institutional strengths and weaknesses. The number of Japanese CSOs has increased but none of them become as dominant. Moreover, they seldom interact with each other, neither for cooperation nor competition. Instead, they have respectively constructed their own networks from which they can activate resources and generate income.

More specifically, WHO's holistic "Active Ageing" policy framework is the organized non-state, non-market sphere in which CSOs operate. Under the "Active Ageing" framework, these CSOs gain their legitimacy from the institutional environment and construct their inter-organizational social capital with stakeholders. Consequently, none of the CSOs has the capacity to stand out above the rest and each CSO remains in its comfort zone. The structural inertia is both the cause and effect of the organizational field.

Epilog and Acknowledgement

Many thanks to the generous support of the Interchange Association, Japan that I am able to conduct this research project. This study has its contribution both practically and academically. This report is what I have learned from some CSOs which I have visited in Tokyo area. But maybe I am wrong as they might be specific cases and can not represent the majority. Can I conclude that there is a "for-profitization" of those NPOs for the elderly? It seems CSOs are more commercialized, but to what extent does such trend offer CSOs benefits and under what circumstances there are pitfalls for the nonprofit sector?

Furthermore, it is also interesting that in Japan we've got COOP as the third sector to serve the elderly, and some of them are trying to be "non-profitized" so that not only members can enjoy their services. Can I say there is another form of "institutional isomorphism" in this case? Obviously more research should be done to answer these questions.

As a super-aged society, Japan has faced challenges and opportunities in the era of population ageing. Though Campbell refutes the claim that there is a unique "Japanese-style welfare state", the similarities between Taiwan and Japan in economic, political, and socio-cultural situation has raised new issues for our understanding of both Japanese and Taiwanese politics and theories of the welfare state. In the visible future, more cooperation between Taiwan and Japan can be expected in terms of population ageing and I am happy to work as the bridge for both sides in relevant issues.

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